Wouldn’t it be interesting to see if sectarianism itself was more dominant in one place than an other, at least online? Are some countries/cities more sectarian than others? Is sectarianism a localised phenomenon, despite what we might see in the news? If we knew this, we could then highlight where to prioritize tackling it.
In order to do this, I conducted an preliminary experiment. Firstly, I would require some way of trying to determine where a piece of sectarian discourse came from. I decided to locate sectarian tweets, as often Twitter accounts come with information about location.
I thought I’d approach ‘anti-Shia’ sectarianism, as the terminology is familiar, and more prevalent (See Alexandra Seigel’s work). I will be doing the same with ‘anti-Sunni’ Tweets too. (I should add, for the record, that I find the terms somewhat grotesque, as the nature of sectarianism cannot be reduced to a binary). Hopefully though, locating the geographic prevalence of specific discourses challenges the problems of essentialising sectarianism as a monolithic and ubiquitous muslim-wide global issue.
Anyway, to test/experiment with this method, I extracted approximately 10,000 tweets that ranged over a four day period (8th – 12th May 2017). These tweets contained at least one of the following, commonly used derogatory terms referring to Shia.
Twitter Search Rule: “ابناء المتعة” OR “روافض” OR “رافضة” OR “اولاد المتعة” OR “مجوسي” OR “المجوسي” OR “صفوي”
The terms largely relate to religious-sectarianism, such as Rafida, Awlad/Ibna al-Muta’, Majusi and Safavid (although this one could be more contested). The archiver, theoretically, takes an ‘almost’ random sample of Tweets from Twitter (see Wang et al for sampling info).
To determine the location of the Tweeter, I did not use the geodata (as this is rarely used by ppl), but information input by the user themselves on their Twitter account. Of course there is no way of knowing if this is accurate or not, but for the sake of this analysis, we must assume a significant amount are true. After filtering out erroneous names, such as people who claim to live in Hogwarts, we were left with around 4500 usable tweets from the original 10,000 tweet sample. I then ran these tweets into Tableau, filtering out duplicate entries (i.e. multiple tweets from the same account). This resulted in about 3,640 unique tweets from unique accounts.
Using Tableau, I first created a cloropeth map that shows the prevalence of sectarian tweets across the region. In the below map, red means a higher prevalence. As you can see, Saudi Arabia and Egypt appear the reddest, and are the places with the highest number of sectarian tweets in this sample.
Yet the above map suggests Egypt and Saudi are alike in terms of tweets. However, the below diagram gives a breakdown of the numbers of tweets, while the surface area of each block represents the proportion of Tweets emanating from each country. As we can see, Saudi Arabia takes the crown with 1,656 Tweets. It is followed by Egypt (420), Kuwait (111), Iraq (71), UAE (56), Yemen (50), Syria (38), Bahrain (36) and Qatar (25) and then Lebanon. (It is worth noting that all countries returned positive hits).
These figures haven’t been controlled for population, or Twitter penetration, the latter of which is difficult to determine (furthermore, figures from the Arab Social Media reports are perhaps distorted by a large number of bots). Nonetheless, if we are to use these figures from the Arab Social Media Report 2017, we can see that in Egypt that for every 3089 Twitter users, there is one sectarian tweet. In Saudi, there is one sectarian Tweet for 1570 Twitter Users. For Kuwait, as another example, there is one sectarian tweet for every 4504 Twitter users. Thus crudely speaking, the results do not balance out when considering Twitter users, meaning that according to this data, the country with the larger amount of tweets are still the ‘more sectarian’.
Where possible, I added latitude and longitude points for location input by users. This allowed me to create a map that shows a more detailed breakdown of Twitter users. As you can see from the below map, Arabic, anti-Shia sectarian Tweets are focused on the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt, with the majority occurring in Saudi, specifically Riyadh, Jeddah, and clusters along the Eastern Province. Northern Egypt is also particularly interesting with regards to the amount of discourse.
Indeed, it would appear from this map, that sectarian discourses online radiate outwards from the middle of Saudi. Of course Riyadh and Jeddah are Saudi’s most populace cities, so it may not be significant in this regard, yet it is interesting to see that Saudi appears to be the centre of this discourse. Also, the rhetoric is almost non-existent across the rest of North Africa and Sudan. It is also not very common in Oman.
The data then, could suggest a number of things:
Online anti-Shia sectarianism are most prevalent in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
Such discourses originated in the Gulf and have traveled abroad
Such discourses are much less common outside the Arabian Peninsula, where there are mixed populations with different histories of national struggle
Of course some potential caveats:
Lexically speaking, the terms used for this study may just be a preferred choice used by those Arabic speakers in the peninsula. Sectarianism in other languages other than Arabic would be interesting to explore in a similar way. Similarly, Arabs in others parts of the ME may use different terms, although I am not sure this is the case.
As yet it’s not sure whether long term analysis would yield similar results. Short term, similar sized samples I have done on individual words or phrases leading up to this blog have returned identical results. Inevitably, a longer sample would mostly likely return more and more sectarian tweets from every country outside the Gulf. As these would also likely increase across every country, the proportionality of sectarian tweets would still likely stay the same.
Similar ways of finding other platforms to analyse would be useful, e.g. Instagram and FB. (Although not sure if people would be inclined to be less or more sectarian on different platforms).
To be clear this is not stating sectarianism does not occur everywhere, just maybe that it is more common in some places than others.
Bahrain in 2011, a wretched hive of scum and villainy. J/k, but it’s always fun to use a Star Wars quote. Am I right?Anyway, was going through some old notes and found multiple instances of all the trolling, harassment, or cyberbullying I faced over the past few years. This is very ‘normal’ if you’re critical of the Bahraini goverment, and I thought it would be good to compile some of them into a blog for people to read.
From being threatened with rape, to being impersonated in the letters page of the local paper, I’ve organzed them according to theme and genre, so you don’t have to!
The ‘gay’ insults, including one from someone who is radio DJ on Bahrain National Radio.
— Jzee (@gr8ful2bh) January 7, 2012
— Jamal AlSaie (@JamalAlSaie) February 3, 2013
— Hasan ALDOY (@aldoyh) October 22, 2011
— Mohammed Janahi (@dj_mojay) October 22, 2011
The rape threats (including one against my mum)
— Dr. Marc Owen Jones (@marcowenjones) January 18, 2012
@marcowenjones بسطره ذي آنه.. إش دخّل أمّك في البحرين..
— Ahmed Abdullatif (@AhmedAbdulatif) April 18, 2013
— Abdulla Noor (@AbdullaMNoor) March 5, 2014
— Abdulla Noor (@AbdullaMNoor) March 14, 2014
— Fais Almuharraqi (@JuicyMuharraqi) January 19, 2012
— warakum (@warakum_bh) December 15, 2011
The generally libelous about being a paid stooge
— Sazzam (@sazzam2k) December 17, 2011
— سماحة السيد حارقهم (@7areghum) August 13, 2011
Or that time someone pretended to be and won the star letter award in the local newspaper for writing an article praising the Bahrain regime. (I am still waiting on that prize)..You can read more here.
All the caricatures
Let’s not forget the the drawings of me, carried out by the anonymous @WatchBahrain
The unauthorised biography
When this website trawled the internet for anything about me, and concluded that not only was I a cyber narcissist, but also a failed musician and actor….(Read the full piece here).
The time I was called a troll (threat level ‘orange’)…
To be fair, this one says I have an ‘irresistible’ smile, but my troll threat level was orange. Also, this one argued that I would attempt to seduce you by singing in Arabic…
The time I was accused of attempting to hack the person who ran the above website…
After the above posts about me and other Bahrain activists, I was accused of illegal activity…
The time I was accused of belonging to a media ‘cell’ designed to harm Bahrain’s reputation…
“الاول : فهد ديشمك باكستاني الجنسية كان في البحرين وذويه مازالوا هنا حيث أن أبيه يعمل في البحرين منذ فترة طويلة، هذا الشخص حسابه في تويتر هو @chanadbh وهذا الشخص يعمل لدى مركز البحرين لحقوق الإنسان التابع لنبيل رجب ويعمل كتف بكتف مع مريم الخواجة بل أحيانا تطلب منه السفر لدول معينة وحضور مؤتمرات ومنتديات بالنيابة عنها، بدأ حملته التشويهية على البحرين منذ عام 2004 تقريبا، وعندما تقدم بطلب للجنسية البحرينية وأثناء فترة تقدمه للطلب كان يقود حملة أكاذيب وتشويه على البحرين في المدونات والإنترنت. فاكتشفت وزارة الداخلية أمره ورحلته من البحرين، وظيفته الحالية هو تقديم الإسناد لمركز البحرين لحقوق الإنسان، والتواصل مع الإعلام الخارجي خصوصا في محيطه لتشويه سمعة البحرين، وكذلك كتابة المقالات في الإنترنت ضد البحرين مع تحريف الحقائق، أيضا هو ينسق مع الخلية الإعلامية في بريطانيا والتي تقاد من @se25a @marcowenjones وينسق كذلك مع الخلية الإعلامية في أمريكا تحت قيادة @alphaleah”
For those interested, I have written a 10,000 word political history of Bahrain covering the 20th and 21st century. It was for Routledge/Europe annual MENA reference. You can read the pre-proofed version here on Research Gate.
Today saw the shooting and killing of three Bahrainis on a boat. They were alleged by the Ministry of the Interior to be escaping to Iran. The three killed were part of a group of ten people who had reportedly escaped from Jaw prison in January 2017. The Ministry of the Interior wrote a lengthy account of events here. While it is possible that the MOI version of events was accurate, this post contends that there is little reason to believe that the information released to the public is adequate in allowing anyone to determine accurately the true nature of events.
Firstly, the pertinent information regarding this operation is as follows (from the MOI website).
The Ministry of Interior has named the deceased as Redha Abdulla Isa Al Ghasra, 29, a fugitive sentenced to 79 years and life imprisonment, Mahmood Yousif Habib Hasan Yahya, 22, and Mustafa Yousif Yousif Abd Ali, 35.
Those arrested have been named as Mohamed Jassim Mohamed Jassim Al Abid, 28, Hamid Jassim Mohamed Jassim Al Abid, 28, and Hasan Ali Mohamed Fardan Al Shakar, 22, all of whom were involved in the terrorist attack on Jau Prison and/or aiding and abetting fugitives. Others arrested included Hani Younis Yousif Ali, 21, Ahmed Ali Ahmed Yousif, 20, Ali Hasan Ali Saleh, 38, and Ahmed Isa Ahmed Isa Al Malali, 23, who were named as being involved in the aiding and abetting of fugitives and the concealment and movement of firearms and explosives.
The Coastguard authority said that items found on the vessel included a Kalashnikov assault rifle which was used to attack the coastguard vessels, a GPS system and satellite phone, ID cards, money and personal items. The authority also noted that those arrested confirmed they were in contact with, and due to meet, accomplices in Iranian waters.
Importantly, a bizarre leaked video of the operation was posted by @Alwatan_live. This can be found below (I would suggest you watch it before continuing)
— Alwatan – الوطن (@Alwatan_Live) February 9, 2017
There is also a clearer, more complete version of the video that was shown in a press conference recorded by BTV. It included aerial footage which indicates helicopters were likely present.
The reasons the videos are bizarre is for a number of reasons, including:
- It is edited in a way that makes it seem rather dramatic, with multiple angles taking from multiple points of view
- It does not give a full or convincing account to corroborate the MOI version of events, with, for example, it only showing one man rising up from the fugitives’ boat with a gun (three people were killed). It does not show who shot first.
- The multiple cuts to the video could suggest that the editing sequence was not a chronological account of what happened
- The fact multiple cameras (probably around three) were evidently used to create all the angles suggests there are numerous recordings of the event from different angles, all of which would give a better idea of what happened if left unedited.
- The initial leaked video was also a recording of a video playing on someone’s laptop – who edited it? Why was it edited?
- The audio is not clear
Some of the frames from the video are puzzling. See below.
The above shot shows a smallish boat that presumably had around 10 people in it. The man circled on the right is, from the video, brandishing a gun. However, what is happening on the left. Is someone driving the boat? Is that someone sitting by the steering wheel? Have the others ducked down? (there are meant to be ten in the boat at this point). What is the high vis looking vest? Why is it raised in the picture, but not in the later ones? Is it a person? None of the video shows clear evidence of the faces of those on board. Following this scene, the police fire (fairly recklessly, but perhaps because they were taken by surprise if the video is legitimate).
At the end of the video you see the empty boat belonging to the fugitives. You do not get a clear view of where the victim was, as it would be in front of the steering wheel. If three people were shot thought maybe you’d expect to see blood? There is no blood. There is also an unusal shot of a policeman picking up what I presume is the assailants gun. The assailant cannot be scene, and again there is no blood.
The MOI also released other photographs showing scenes from the police operation. These included photos of a police boat with holes in. As you can see from the first photo of the boat, the bullet holes appear to be on the left of the front of the boat. These, if the video is accurate, would presumably be exit wounds, as this boat, identifiable by the number reflected in the sea, pulled up on the right of the fugitive boat in the video. The shooter would have been on the opposite side of these holes (unless the photo is flipped). However, in another video you see the other side of the boat, where the bullets should have entered, but it doesn’t look like there are many (except one hole). Perhaps this is nothing, but it still is not clear from what people are being presented.
For what was clearly well resourced operation, it is unclear why the security services had to result in deadly force. There are at least three coastguard boats involved. In the above picture you can see two boats, and there is also the boat from which the photo is taken. While there are inevitably procedural questions, e.g. where was this procedure learned, was the engine disabled before the boat was approached?
Opportunity for Propaganda
The MOI were very quick to mention Iran. In addition to releasing a photo of a map stating that the smugglers intended to go to Iran, the MOI’s first tweet, before even announcing the deaths, was about Iran.
PT: 1st operation in Bahrain’s surrounding waters, was undertaken following an attempt by escapees from Jau prison to flee 2Iranian waters
— Ministry of Interior (@moi_bahrain) February 9, 2017
While this doesn’t undermine the potential veracity of the MOI’s statement, it does, along with the bizarrely slick editing of the video, point to a very well planned media event, one clearly designed to show a hard hitting security force ready to defend Bahrain from Iran. It also feeds into the regime’s discourse that Iran is behind the unrest, and the escape of the detainees from Jau.
Whether true or not, if I were a Bahraini (irrespective of political stance), I would want to see an unedited video, and a better account of events from the MOI. This would include a proper explanation of how such a well prepared group of Coasguard and security officers allowed the smugglers to get so far out to sea before killing them.
In the middle of the night, on January 15 2017, three citizens of Bahrain were executed by firing squad. Abbas al-Samea, 27, Ali al-Singace, 21, and Sami Mushaima 42, had all been found guilty of planting a bomb which killed three policemen – but their convictions were widely seen as unsafe.
Rumours of their 3am deaths had been circulating on the social media of those with links to the government. Once the state news agency confirmed the news, many Bahrainis took to the streets in protest, confronting riot police, who used tear gas and birdshot in response. Human rights organisations condemned the killings, not simply because they oppose the death penalty, but because these executions were viewed as being political and extrajudicial.
The UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial executions tweeted:
#Bahrain executed Abbas al-Samea, Ali al-Singace, Sami Mushaima. Torture, unfair trial + flimsy evidence: these are extrajudicial killings
— Dr Agnes Callamard (@AgnesCallamard) January 15, 2017
Nicholas McGeehan of Human Rights Watch added on social media: “These men’s convictions were based on retracted confessions and mired in allegations of serious torture.” It was a sentiment reflected poignantly by many Bahrainis, who formed huge queues to pay their respects to the executed men’s families.
The national controversy surrounding the executions is the latest demonstration of the political turmoil in Bahrain, and popular opposition to what is a democracy in name only. Since 2011, when widespread pro-democracy protests broke out, over a hundred civilians have been killed – many by teargas and torture. An independent report (the BICI report) documenting the events of that year revealed systematic torture, arbitrary detentions, and extra judicial killing in the streets
But things are actually getting worse. Amid the token reforms, the January executions show that Bahrain is regressing with regards to political development and human rights. The country’s only remotely critical newspaper, Al Wasat, which was shut down in 2011, has now been ordered by the government to close its online paper, too. The official reason given was that it was “jeapordising national unity and disrupting public peace”. In fact, it had been slighty critical of the executions.
Earlier this year, the government of Bahrain announced that it was reversing one of the BICI reforms which stipulated that Bahrain’s National Security Agency (NSA) have its powers of arrest removed. The power separation was considered important in controlling torture. Other laws enacted which have clamped down on freedom of expression, alongside the arrest of activists, have prompted accusations not of reform, but of de-democratisation. The fact that these are the first official executions to have occurred since 2010 suggest Bahrain is becoming more, not less authoritarian.
Bahrain’s small size and its reliance on foreign countries has also resulted in anger at the perceived complicity of numerous governments. Saudi troops, along with officers from states including the UAE, assisted in dealing with the unrest in 2011. Many of Bahrain’s military officers are from other Arab or Muslim countries, and many have received training by the British (including from John Yates, ex-assistant Commissioner of Scotland Yard).
As a result, many Bahrainis feel increasingly isolated from the global community, who they believe are the only ones able to put pressure on the Bahrain government to reform, democratise, and implement human rights reform. Activist Maryam Al Khawaja accused the UK, Bahrain’s former protector, of abetting this authoritarian excess and allowing the executions to go ahead. She wrote on Twitter:
— Maryam Alkhawaja (@MARYAMALKHAWAJA) January 15, 2017
Protests in London outside the embassy also reflected this anger. And it is an anger founded not simply on the fact that the British response to the executions was considered “woefully inadequate”, but because the UK has been training the Bahrain police since 2011. The charity Reprieve noted that the UK also taught the Bahrainis how to “whitewash custody deaths” and provided training to the police without conducting proper human rights assessments.
As a result of the executions, frustration in Bahrain will inevitably increase. Scenes of people chanting “Down with [King] Hamad” at the police are becoming more common again. The regression back to more authoritarian ways is enabled by a lack of pressure from traditional international allies.
For the UK, this apparent “complicity” is unlikely to change. Jane Kinninmont of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, notes that Brexit will likely diminish attempts to support human rights. With traditional allies like the UK less choosy about trade, less choosy about allies, and less choosy about human rights, Bahrain is set to see more instability and unrest.
(Cartoon added by me)
Bahrain’s Ministry of the Interior reported today that one policeman was killed and two others injured in a Molotov Cocktail attack on a police keep in the village of Karbabad. International media such as Associated Press have already reported the MOI’s version of events.
However, there are other reports stating that the police keep crashed into a skip lorry, and that the incident is being used to blame residents. At least three videos (see below) show a police jeep appearing to have collided with a lorry carrying a skip, although the circumstances leading up to the crash remain unclear.
Another video (see below) shows a slightly better quality close up, and it appears that the windshield of the skip lorry was smashed, as if it had suffered an impact. The jeep, however, appears to have impacted the truck off the main course of the road, implying that it had gone off track. This could have been the result of, as the MOI say, a Molotov attack, or (avoiding one) – or other reasons, such as loss of control. The fact the jeep was in flames also adds weight to the argument that it was hit by a fire bomb.
To quote from Bahrain Watch’s own page.
On Tuesday 10th March 2015, the Information Rights Tribunal in London is considering whether to order the Foreign Office to reveal secret communications between Foreign Office officials which are nearly 40 years old. In June 2013, Marc Jones, a Durham university PhD student and member of the NGO, Bahrain Watch made a Freedom of Information Request to the FCO asking for a secret file entitled “Bahrain: Internal Political situation 1977”. The FCO refused to disclose the full file arguing to reveal the information would damage international relations. He complained to the Information Commissioner who rejected his complaint on the basis that prejudice would be caused to the UK’s relations with Bahrain if it was made public. See the outline of the case here.
A Positive Verdict: We were not optimistic of a win. In fact, we were alerted to the fact that Tribunals often side with the government. However, when the verdict came, the judge said that it would be reserved for a later date. Essentially, this meant that they could not reach a decision on the day. For us, this was good, and highlighted that the FCO’s case was not watertight, and that the information they were hiding may actually be in the public interest to know. In other words, the information is not trivial.
A Peculiar Trial. The Trial did not begin as anticipated. Although we were expecting to give evidence first, the FCO were quite insistent that Edward Oakden, a senior diplomat and witness, should go first. This was because he had appointments in the evening. Naturally, I had cancelled my appointments because we were told the court case would last all day – a sensible and not unreasonable course of action. Oakden’s evidence was brief, and mostly consisted him of evading questions by saying ‘I shall refer to that in the secret portion of the trial’. (I should perhaps add that the FCO and the judges had a private session in which the redacted contents could be revealed – of course neither we nor the public were entitled to attend). After the secret session the FCO and their barrister were quite clear on one thing, that whatever was in the document would not address my general and specific concerns about British complicity in Human Rights abuses in Bahrain, nor would it shed light on Henderson’s actions in Kenya’. However, they also stressed that release of the information would DEFINITELY damage the relationship between Britain and Bahrain.
When our turn to give evidence came, we focused essentially on why the information would not be revelatory. I.e. we already know so much of the egregious acts committed by the British and the Al Khalifa that new information would not be significantly new. We were careful to stress that the current Prime Minister and King were implicated in illegal activities during 1977, including the deporting of Shia to Iran. So as Rodney Trotter once said, you’d “have to get done for chicken molesting to bring a slur on this family’s name”. We also emphasised that complicity was a broad term, and could include a wide variety of things (The FCO did not really specify in what manner they meant it). We also highlighted that the FCO’s argument about the piece not containing information about British complicity did not speak of Al Khalifa or security forces’ role in HR abuses. Either way, given the continuous human rights abuses in Bahrain, and the fact 17 British officers were in the Bahrain police at the time, and that both the intelligence and general divisions of policing were led by British men, we argued that any information about the state of the security forces was in the public interest as it is was almost always the security services engaged in human rights abuses.
Their barrister’s cross-examination of our evidence seemed somewhat lackluster. It centered on a number of superficial arguments. The most salient one seemed to be saying that I was in no position to comment on how a revelation would harm relations between Bahrain and Britain as I was not, nor ever had been, a diplomat. I did, of course, remind them that I had spent a good part of the past few years studying diplomatic cables. Our legal team also stressed that the threshold for information that counts as warranting a diplomatic response is so low that it made the process somewhat unfair. For example, if releasing the information forced the British to explain to the Bahrainis why they had done this – this counts as a diplomatic response. Importantly, the FCO admitted that disclosing the information would not harm the new base deal. Whatever happened, the FCO’s caginess simply has increased anticipation about what the withheld information could contain.
What could the information be?
Well, despite their barrister’s protestations that I was simply guessing the contents of the cable, I reminded him that at least it was an educated guess. I also reminded him that when they were refusing to give us any inkling of what the documents contained, which they ought to have done. However, I think the biggest clue as to what the information might be was alluded to by one of the judges. I was asked when the following paragraph, was released to the public:
Selman bin Hamad has all the worst qualities of the Al Khalifa family. He is totally uneducated, vain, lazy, and inclined to oppress and tyrannize over anyone who is powerless to resist. Selman is absolutely unfit to succeed is father as ruler.
The comment, which was made in 1923 by a British official, was probably released because Selman bin Hamad is dead. But why would the judge be so concerned about when it was released, especially after she had seen the censored document in the private hearing? The most logical explanation is that contains information that was probably critical of a member of the Ruling Family who is still alive. This theory is confirmed by the bits of information which you can actually read from the heavily redacted document. In particular the following:
What surprised me in our conversation was the gloomy view he took of the ability of the Al Khalifa to survive. [Redacted]. They were moving into lucrative areas of business and squeezing out established merchants.
If this is the case, then surely the FCO could have said that the redacted information contains information critical of certain individuals? However, they did not reveal a thing. Instead, their barrister asked me whether the information would be in the public interest if it, for example, it was about the police having ‘yellow uniforms’. Obviously this is absurd, as they would not be fighting so hard to keep it secret if it was about yellow uniforms…
A final note…
If there’s ever a misnomer, it’s the ‘Freedom of Information Act’ . I say so because if you want to get anything, potentially of value to the public, it’s going to cost you – both in terms of money and time. What happened on Tuesday was the culmination of months of work, and considerable legal cost. This bureaucratic control is essentially a process of attrition, a series of obstacles designed to discourage people from breaching the government’s asymmetry of information. Indeed, the FCO have denied at least two thirds of the information requests I have sent them the earliest being from 1956 (a year when British troops were used to help put down a populist uprising in Bahrain). For those who want more information on the case, you can read my witness statement > 819867 Witness statement of Appellant & exhibit sheet 28 11 14 (4). Oakden’s heavily redacted statement can be read here> 885992 01 Response of FCO 13 02 15 (pages 1.48 to 1.51)_ 05 Witness statement of Edward Oakden (unsigned undated) 13 02 15 (page… . To see the heavily redacted version of the contested document, go here >
Article in Bahrain Al Youm [Arabic]
Short interview [Arabic]