Attitudes of British Officials to the Al Khalifa Family Between 1920 and 1954

King Hamad recently rocked up at the first Windsor International Endurance Festival, where he gave a speech in which he described Bahrain’s historic relationship with Britain as one of ‘cooperation and friendship’. Hamad then expressed sadness at Britain’s withdrawal from Bahrain in 1971, quoting his father as saying;

“Why? – No one asked you to go!”

King Hamad’s desire to surround himself in the UK with other people who love horses does not detract from the fact that Bahrain’s relationship with Britain has been one of mutual convenience as opposed to true friendship. Indeed, despite this so-called ‘friendship’, the attitude of many British officials to the ruling Al Khalifa family was one of disgust and frustration. A selection of quotes attributed to various British officials on the subject of the Al Khalifa is included below. Before I am accused of historic muck raking, I should point out that such comments are important in contextualizing Britain’s relationship with Bahrain, and erode the veneer of legitimacy that horse-based events and other efforts at ‘High Society Diplomacy’ attempt to confer upon this so-called friendship. Also, sometimes these things are just plain interesting.

This blog post is focused more on the historic attitude of British officials towards the ruling family in general as opposed to specific cases. The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights have documented scandals perpetrated by the Ruling Family by collating all the examples mentioned in the papers of Charles Belgrave – financial adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain between 1926 and 1957 . Similarly, I have blogged or written about various other acts of oppression or political crime performed by members of the Ruling Family, so often aided and abetted by the British. Some of these are listed at the end of this blog.

Attitudes of Some British Officials to the Bahrain Ruling Family between 1920 and 1956.

In 1923, Political Resident Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Trevor wrote about Salman bin Hamad – Bahrain’s ruler between between 1942 and 1961:

Selman bin Hamad has all the worst qualities of the Al Khalifa family. He is totally uneducated, vain, lazy, and inclined to oppress and tyrannize over anyone who is powerless to resist. Selman is absolutely unfit to succeed is father as ruler.

Colonel Knox (who seemed to entertain an equal disdain of all Bahrain’s communities) wrote in 1923:

Gentlemen of the Al Khalifa: I am afraid that looking to the past is my duty to warn you that you must not expect that because you have taken the trouble to be born you ave therefore a right to live on the rest of the community , whether by allowances from the revenues of these Islands or by preying on the poor and helpless

C.C.J. Barrett, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote in 1929:

The family – the Al Khalifa – were uneducated savages with a veneer of town manners

Charles Belgrave wrote in 1926 (21 August):

The Khalifa family is the Royal Family of Bahrain, & very much so. They are paid allowances by the Govt & do nothing apparently considering it infra dig to do any work, they are lazy conceited oppressive people for the most part, living on being royalty.

Charles Belgrave wrote in 1929:

With a few exceptions the Khalifa family are lazy, almost illiterate, and entirely without public spirit.

Bahrain’s Political Agent Captain C. G. Prior  wrote in 1929:

…apart from these all adult Al Khalifa are nonentities, incapable or vicious or all three.

Charles Belgrave wrote in his diary in 1954.

…now nobody has any opinion of the Khalifah, they are drunken, dotty & dishonest & have entirely lost the little prestige that they once had. The only one of them who people in any way respect is HH & they are rapidly losing their respect for him.

Acting Political Agent J.E.R. Little wrote in 1955:

…the ruler has donated a quarter of a million rupees to education, health and public protection. Other members of Al Khalifa apparently are impervious to the promptings of conscience.

Rape, Booze and Torture: The Princes’ Diaries

Scrutizing the Civil List in Bahrain  

How the Al Khalifas Took a Quarter of Bahrain’s Wealth

Bahrain’s History of Political Injustice 

‘Oppression of Bahrain Subjects by the Ruling Family in Bahrain in the early 1900s: The Full List

How camels led to murder and sectarian tension in Bahrain

Who Really Tried to Assassinate Shaikh Hamad?

Some Thoughts on the Pros and Cons of Videos of State Violence

Back in 2011, I wrote an article called ‘Social Media, Surveillance and Social Control in the Bahrain Uprising’ for Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture.  It was finally published last month. Naturally it is a bit dated, and although my research interests have shifted somewhat to studying more general processes of controlling dissent, I still maintain an interest in social media.

A question that has always preoccupied me is this: what is the impact of videos of violence, and in particular videos of state violence, on the longevity of conflict. How do these videos effect the dynamics of the conflict? It occurred to me that these depictions of violence serve a useful social control function. As I wrote in a blog post for Bahrain Watch a few months ago;

… it is interesting to consider what effects the existence of such videos have, especially when the perpetrators are not being held accountable? Do they simply serve to increase public anger towards the police and the government, or do they have the effect of generating fear of authority – or both? Either way, the social control function is useful. If they generate fear of authority, the benefits to the regime are self explanatory. If they further public anger, and potentially increase radicalization leading to further violence, then the opposition movement will remain fragmented – making it easier for the regime to operate a divide and rule policy.

The depiction of state violence in videos or images circulated on social media serve a similar function to legal corporal punishment that existed before its abolishment. In Bahrain, this took the form of lashes in the market place. The location was as important as the punishment itself, and market places were chosen in order to maximise the number of people witnessing the event. The only difference now is that physical location need not constrain the number of those who witness state violence. Videos of violence transcend temporal and spatial boundaries, serving as a permanent reminder of state brutality.

While videos of state violence on social media may also provoke anger, they still serve to remind people of the costs of engaging in protest or dissent. Indeed, in times of political upheaval, authorities benefit from reminding the public of their vulnerability by showing what happens to those who break the rules. As Turk (1982) states, ‘ a scarcely less barbarous tactic is the public display of mutilated bodies, or of persons maimed by their ordeals in the hands of police’. By hiding such abuses, the regime are less able to use violence to deter potential troublemakers from engaging in such acts. A truly totalitarian regime like that of Pol Pot, would simply eliminate every possible rival, yet authoritarian regimes, less extreme on the scale of tyranny, will target opponents more specifically, and utilise these cases in order to deter and terrorize the rest of the population.

Although the authorities will attempt to limit or prevent people from circulating images or videos of police brutality or state violence, periodic reminders of the brutal consequences of  engaging in dissent are useful. After all,  if  people did not believe that the costs of engaging in dissent could result in torture or death, they would be more emboldened in challenging the state.

Some of my previous research on Bahrain, which analysed YouTube comments on videos of political violence, is also relevant. Videos of such violence generally provoked polarized responses in which many articulated their political and religious position. Indeed, such videos of political violence could arguably contribute to increased polarisation of fragmentation between Sunni and Shia, or those who ‘support’ and ‘oppose’ the current government. This sowing of divisions, though bad for society, assists the regime in their policy of divide and rule. In the recent uprising, supporters of the government use videos of protesters throwing Molotovs to defend the actions of the state, wile those who want reform use videos of police brutality to draw attention to their cause. In this sense, it is often people’s political position that determines how they interpret or select these videos. In both cases, consumption appears to be a form of validation rather than a challenge to one’s own belief system.

Having said all this, videos of state violence are damaging in the sense that they are a PR disaster. Continued used of coercive methods may be useful in the short run, yet coercion ‘maximizes alienation’, and makes it more difficult for any regime to achieve any legitimacy (Dallin and Breslauer, 1970, 3) This inherent paradox can partially be resolved by distancing the action of state agents from elites who benefit from such violence. I.e. State violence depicted on social media can be said by the government to be the action of a few bad apples, a few policeman whom the regime did not have control over. Consequently, there will be some show trials where few policeman will be convicted, or in the case of Bahrain, convicted but probably let off after a laborious process of repeated trials and appeals.  As Turk (1982) states, Court and administrative decisions exonerating legal control agents are to be expected in any polity.’

Of course, the more videos that emerge of state violence and police brutality, the more difficult it is for authorities to convince people that such acts are the work of a few bad apples. Therfore regulating the amount of images or videos of police brutality is perhaps more about controlling the flow of information, and determining when people should be reminded of the state’s brutality, rather than any real objection to people witnessing those deeds.

Concluding remarks

Despite the utility of reminding people of the violent consequences of engaging in dissent, the reliance on short term methods of coercive force at the expense of political processes that appease the population  can be explained by the fact that such processes would require more wealth and power sharing . As Turk (1982) again states,

Alternatives to intimidation may simply be unacceptable because they are perceived to involve intolerable changes in the allocation of resources among competing groups, even to the point of dismantling the existing strutures of power and status.

So just as violence is seen as a necessary political risk, one that weighs up the benefits of continued protection of resources with those of sharing those resources, the impact of mediated violence poses another conundrum. Do the benefits of intimidating the population through depictions of state violence outweigh the negatives? After all, how do you pacify a population without doing the following a) sacrificing significant power and wealth b) terrorizing them and c) convincing them (brainwashing) that the current social order is infallible and true.

Bahrain’s Prime Minister and his Role in the Anti-Shia Crackdown of the 1980s

‘He cries because they have nothing left to steal’ Sign: ‘Foreign Banks’ (Image is of Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa)

Bahrain has the dubious honor of having the world’s longest serving Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa. He has been in power since Bahrain gained independence in 1971. Given that lack of dynamism in any political structure is often a recipe for stagnation and regression, it makes sense to explore the Prime Minister’s historic and current role in security and policing policy. Indeed, could his continued presence in office be a contributing factor to Bahrain’s failure to reach political compromise? More specifically, to what extent has his presence, or indeed his personality,  created an increasingly sectarian policing policy that has sought to exacerbate communal strife in Bahrain for the purpose of executing a divide and rule strategy?

While it is perhaps difficult to ascertain the Prime Minister’s role behind the recent crackdown, a look at the historical records of Bahrain suggest he was perhaps more involved in policing policy than has previously been stated. This was particularly true following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when much was made of how Shia religious activists in Bahrain represented a ‘fifth column’  that wanted to export the Revolution to Bahrain. Followers of today’s uprising will be aware how the Bahrain government portray the uprising as an Iran-backed plot in order to discredit those who want political reform.

The Prime Minister himself has stated openly that the opposition in today’s uprising are acting on Iranian orders. In an  interview he gave to Der Spiegel in 2012, he stated

This movement is supported by Iran and Hezbollah…. The king has gone a long way in making many offers to them [the opposition], but in the end they told us they had to wait to see what Iran would tell them.

Shifting Authority within Internal Security

So how might the Prime Minister have been more actively involved in policing policy? Well, following Bahrain’s Independence from Britain in 1971, the head of the police and special branch were both both British. These were James Bell and Ian Henderson respectively. The FCO documents suggest that both Henderson and Bell had begun to have less influence over internal security policy as early as 1973.  State Department documents posted by wikileaks today corroborate this, stating that Bell and Henderson are moving into more of an ‘advisory’ position. In fact, they indicate that the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior (Shaikh Muhammad bin Sulman Al Khalifa) began to call the shots. Robert Tesh, British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1975 writes to the FCO

Two years ago the Chief of the Police and the Head of the Special Branch, both British, came directly under the Prime Minister and were regularly and visibly in close and constant touch with him. Now they hardly ever see him, but work to a Bahraini Minister of the Interior who is fortunately conscientious and hard-working. The Chief of Police is now ‘Director-General of Public Security’, advising and administering from the background rather than exercising direct executive control. He has lost much of his power, and rather sadly accepts this. The Head of Special Branch – which is now, at the top, wholly expatriate – is no longer allowed to detain or interrogate; his intelligence network must therefore function by other means, and the power of deterrence has dwindled. On the other hand the Government is far less exposed to the accusation of ‘imperialist repression’ than it was: and provided it does not become complacent and over-confident the new arrangements should work. The risk of complacency is not too serious as long as the present Prime Minister is in power.

Although Henderson’s changing role does not imply anything about his complicity in carrying out torture, it does have important implications for the potential rise in cases of torture. Indeed, following the crushing of leftist groups such as PFLOAG and the NLF in Bahrain, the latter of which had, according to a report by Bahrain Special Branch,  been ‘penetrated at all levels by Bahrain Security Forces’ in 1968, the opposition vacuum was  filled by the ‘Shia threat’ in the late 70s and early 80s. As such, large swathes of Bahrain’s population became a potential criminal threat, not because of their political beliefs per se, but because of the religious leanings. Naturally when you begin to potentially criminalise over half of the population, there will inevitably be an increase in arrests and, as a corollary, torture.

Despite the significance of the Iranian Revolution, it was the Iran Iraq conflict and Shia opposition to Iraq rather than the toppling of the Shah that was the catalyst for the Government’s crackdown on Bahrain’s Shia. According to British Ambassador Harold Walker (1980), support for Khomeini since the outbreak of the Iran/Iraq conflict had been negligible:

Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began there have, as you know, been virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shia for the Imam Khomeini’

Incidentally, Harold Walker seems to have changed his tune. In a 2011 article for the Conservative Middle East Council, Walker acknowledges that although the BICI report found no evidence of Iranian involvement, Iran had been the single most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion into opposition politics.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the impact of Iran has been the single most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion into opposition politics.

Torture of Jamal Ali Muhsin Al ALi and Escalation of Tensions

In fact the Shia threat was always overstated, and the government knew this. In fact, both the British and the Bahraini authorities appeared to be entirely relaxed about the potential for trouble in 1980. Although there were demonstrations, some of which turned violent, they were poorly attended and few in number. One such demonstration took place in April 1980, following Iraq’s execution of cleric Mohammed Baqr al-Sadir. After securing permission from the authorities, thousands of people marched in protest at the killing, though some people reportedly deviated from the arranged route and started burning tyres and throwing stones.  64 people were arrested, including Jamal Ali Muhsin Al Ali, who authorities accused of attacking and wounding two Bahraini Army Intelligence officers in the Souq.  Sadly, Al Ali was reportedly tortured to death*. British First Secretary Christopher Wilton mentioned Al Ali’s ‘well photographed wounds inflicted by the Bahraini Police’, and described him as the ‘first Bahraini Shia martyr’.

In an attempt to counter the rumours about Al Ali’s torture, the Ministry of the Interior issued a statement that was reported in the Gulf Daily News. They said that Al Ali had died of ‘kidney failure’. Those following the Feb14 Uprising will probably remember that the Ministry of the Interior attributed the death of Karim Fakhrawi to ‘kidney failure’. In actual fact, Karim Fakhrawi was tortured to death by the Bahrain Security Forces. (It is interesting to see the continuities of propaganda). One thousand people reportedly showed up to collect Jamal’s body from the hospital. Although the burial was peaceful, some members of the crowd then proceeded to burn tyres in the Souq.

More demonstrations occurred on the 18th and 19th June, when Hadi al Mudarrasi (exiled Iraqi cleric residing in Tehran) called on Bahrainis to mark the 40 day anniversary of Jamal’s death. According to FCO documents, only 200 people took part in these demonstrations. It was about this time the FCO and the Chief of Staff began to complain about the influx of propaganda pamphlets produced by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Most of these pamphlets (one of which you can see above) appeared to focus on political  corruption and Bahrain’s relationship with the US and Britain. On the other hand, propaganda from the Islamic Martyrs Movement was far more militant, pledging support for Khomeini and calling for death to Al Khalifa.

The Crackdown on the Shia

Despite these demonstrations, the authorities predicted a peaceful Ashura. Harold Walker writes in November 1980:

‘no necessary reason why the Ashura celebrations should lead to political disturbances any more than they have over the last decade. But they cannot exclude the possibility that tempers might flare up on account of some quite accidental occurrence such as pressure on the Shia crowd by unwise spectators’

Irrespective of whether Ashura was peaceful or not, the Prime Minister seemed keen to adopt a more draconian and sectarian internal security policy with regards to the Shia threat.

The Police have orders to intervene as little as possible – though the Prime Minister said that firm action would have to be taken once Ashura was out of the way.  (Walker to FCO, 17th November 1980)

As was predicted, Ashura passed peacefully. Interestingly, when trying to ascertain why Ashura had passed by so quietly, the British thought the authorities might have spread a rumour  that Saudi troops were in the country in order to scare the Shia.

There was a rumour, which may or may not have been inspired by the authorities, that Saudi troops were in Bahrain; this certainly had some effect as the Saudis inspire considerable fear among the Bahraini Shias.

Despite the fact Ashura had passed peacefully, the Prime Minister was true to his word and ordered the arrest of 650 people. This was in addition to the 200 people who had been arrested beforehand.  The fact Ashura had been peaceful actually ‘encouraged’ the Prime Minister to order widespread arrest of Shia. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s reason for moving against the Shia was reportedly to demonstrate to them that the ‘Bahrain Government were true Arabs’. Apparently even Ian Henderson disagreed with the decision to order this crackdown, as it would ‘probably have the opposite effect from that desired’. The information here is from a message written by Kevin Passmore of the Middle East Department. He was reporting a conversation with Christopher Wilton.  Here is the full message.

Christopher Wilton, 1 sec in Bahrain at present home leave, told me on 1 DEcember that the Bahrain authorities had decided to move against the Shia. Ashura (18/19 November) passed off peacefully. Encouraged by this, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifah, had felt confident enough to order widespread arrests of Shia. Before Ashura  some 200 had been arrested; now the total was 850, all of whom were to be detained without trial for an indefinite period. Ian Henderson, the Head of the Bahrain Security Service (who was Mr Wilton’s informant) had advised the Bahranis strongly against this course of action, saying that it was likely to lead to more Shia ‘martyrs’and would probably have the opposite effect from that desired. Sheikh Khalifa, however, had felt that the time had come to show the Shia that the Bahrain Government were ‘True Arabs’. (It is not entirely clear what he meant by this, but he probably refers to the open support given by many Bahraini Shia to IRan in the current conflict.)  (KJ Passmore to Mr Palmer, Mr Miers – 3rd December 1980)

Of course one might dismiss this as being a fairly elaborate scheme to protect the British  from accusations of excessive involvement in internal affairs. However, it does raise a number of important questions? Namely, did torture increase in Bahrain following 1975. This is, after all, the approximate date when Human Rights Organisations  began to record torture in Bahrain*.  Or does 1975 simply reflect the fact organisations such as Amnesty began to better document such cases? Afterall, brutal methods of interrogation were used in police custody as far back as the 1930s by the likes of Charles Belgrave and Captain Parke in attempting to extract information from prisoners, political or otherwise.

Having said that, is it possible that the Prime Minister’s increased control over internal security policy prompted a punitive sectarian crackdown thats sheer scale inevitably led to an increase in prisoners, and thus an increase in torture? To what extent did the influx in Shia ‘religious’  prisoners exacerbate sectarian tensions between prisoner and police officer, leading to more harsh treatment? How did the crackdown, and the torture of prisoners simply serve to radicalize religious opposition and thus attract them to more extreme causes (Afterall, policing policy in the 1950s very much relied on sewing divisions within the CNU in order to radicalise and fragment them – thus generating wider support for a crackdown)?  How credible was the alleged 1981 coup attempt that aimed to install a theocratic government?

Indeed, to what extent was crackdown on Shia simply a redux of Al Khalifa divide and rule policies that existed before increased British involvement in the 1920s? Afterall, discontent with the Al Khalifa in the 1980s was not just the preserve of the Shia –  ‘moderates’, leftists and students all had grievances. The possibility of all groups uniting to oppose the regime was a very real one, so maintaining disunity by exaggerating the Shia threat would work to isolate those groups who feared that Bahrain would turn into a theocratic state. Indeed, such divide and conquer have worked seamlessly well in the recent uprising.

But why have a crackdown when the Ruling Family and,  as Harold Walker jokes, the Al Zayyanis and Al Moyyads, could have broadened their support by reviving the National Assembly dissolved by the Prime Minister in 1975. Well, to resurrect such an assembly so soon after dissolving the last one would have been a sign of weakness, one that may have emboldened political leaders to demand more than the Ruling Family were willing to concede. Perhaps a divide and conquer strategy was simply a better way of preserving a kleptocratic autocracy that had little desire for accountability and power sharing.

Obviously I do not wish to overstate the case of the Prime Minister’s power. After all, to do so would to be sideline other members of the Ruling Family, which itself runs the risk of emphasizing that Bahrain’s draconian security policy in Bahrain is the result of a few bad apples. Indeed, much was made recently of the role of the Khawalid in undermining King Hamad, an argument that tends to absolve Hamad and the PM of their responsibility by painting them as victims of an Arabian Nights esque political saga. I also do not wish to understate the role of the British, who were keen to nip protests in the bud so as not to alarm ‘banks and board rooms’. After all, it was the British who supported the 1975 State Security Law  (although it is interesting to note that even the Butcher of Bahrain (Henderson) may have opposed the Prime Minister’s decision to move against the Shia en masse). While British concerns for internal security had been a dominating factor of British involvement in Bahrain, emphasising Henderson’s role in torture was still a useful sponge that could deflect criticism from the ruling family onto the imperialist oppressor. Indeed, Shaikh Salman in the 1950s frequently told the CNU that he would love to initiate reforms, if only the British allowed him to.

Anyway, I digress slightly. The Prime Minister is perhaps Bahrain’s most experienced statesmen, and it is hardly surprising given Bahrain’s political structure that aspects of a dominating personality may manifest themselves in security policy.  Is it not possible that part of the Prime Minister’s modus operandi is simply the reassertion of what Abdulhadi Al Khalaf describes as the Al Khalifa’s ‘legacy of conquest’, one that was diminished by increasing British involvement in Bahrain during the 1920s?

Note: This post is a work in progress, and I wrote it somewhat in haste as I was going through notes I took several months ago.  As always, comments are welcome!

 *Karim Al Hibshi was also tortured to death by Security Forces in July 1980

** Strangely, the Americans claimed that there was no ‘plausible’ evidence of torture in Bahrain in 1976. This was despite reports to the contrary issued by Amnesty International in 1974 and 1975

Who Really Tried to Assassinate Shaikh Hamad?

In 1929, Ibrahim bin Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa (a nephew of Bahrain’s former ruler Isa bin Ali) was convicted for instigating a failed assassination attempt against Sheikh Hamad in 1926. Although the men who carried out the attack were given varying prison sentences, Ibrahim was exonerated by Shaikh Hamad, who argued that because the attack had been against him, he had the power to forgive. Hamad’s mercy stemmed from both his weakness and desire to maintain family unity, itself an important factor in preventing further challenge to his rule.

However, an important aspect of the case that has so far been omitted from historical studies of Bahrain is that the initial investigations suggested that it was the ruler’s brother, Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa Al Khalifa, who had been behind the assassination attempt (I have written previously about Shaikh Abdullah’s record of rape, extortion, theft and murder here). Understandably, Hamad was troubled by the news that his brother had orchestrated an attempt to kill him, though it seems the accusations were suddenly dropped. Despite the ‘ considerable evidence’ against Abdullah, he was brought in to augment the judges on the Bahrain Court that convicted Ibrahim. When it was suggested that Abdullah be put on the court, Belgrave writes rather cryptically in his diary

‘As Abdullah is one of the people implicated he would be certain to condemn the men to shield himself, and if they accused him in Court he is quite clever enough to suppress any such idea. I think it would be a good idea to put him on the Court’.

Unless Belgrave has made a grammatical error, he appears to support Abdullah’s position as a judge in order to protect himself from accusations against his involvement in the assassination attempt on his brother. Given Abdullah’s previous, inexorable attempts to undermine Hamad’s rule, his involvement would not be unlikely. Such evidence, in addition to Abdullah’s continued attempts to work against Hamad, contradict Fuad Khuri’s assertion that Abdullah committed himself to maintaining unity within the ruling family following the abdication of Shaikh Isa in 1923. Indeed,  Khuri’s idea that Abdullah became a conciliator as opposed to a party to conflict seems too simplistic, and it was perhaps the fear of losing a generous stipend from the state that induced Abdullah to limit his intrigues against Hamad. Furthermore, despite Abdullah’s attempts to work against Hamad, he was perceived by the British as the most competent Al Khalifa, and one who was important in getting Shaikh Isa’s supporters to cooperate more fully with Hamad’s rule. Whether or not Abdullah was behind the assassination attempt is unclear, though far from unlikely. Furthermore, although Abdullah was, according to Belgrave, a ‘bad hat’, ruling family fratricide was not unusual in the Gulf at the time.

If Abdullah did attempt to kill his brother, it simply marks yet another instance of his ability to evade justice. Furthermore, the fact he was a judge on the court set a precedent for political trials in Bahrain. Let us not forget that Abdullah was one of the three judges who sat on the court that sentenced the leaders of the Committee of National Union to exile on St. Helena in 1956.

 

Fallen Fruit, Foreign Plots and Road Rage: Today in Bahrain

Even by Bahrain standards, today was pretty eventful. In addition to widespread protests, police repression, and terrible GDN articles, there were the curious incidents of fallen fruit, foreign plots and road rage. This post details those incidents – not because they are linked, but because they all tell their own, interesting story.

Road Rage

Today a woman from Muharraq who alleged she was attacked by protesters stepped out of her vehicle and confronted the perpetrators. On her Twitter feed  she states that her car was attacked with planks and stones. Full of rage,  she got out of the car (whose radio was playing ahlan ya buu Salman – an homage to the Al Khalifas) and filmed herself berating the youths (Video clips here and here). Among the terms of insult were ‘sons of dogs’, ‘terrorists’, and ‘faggots’. She also yelled ‘ Down, down Isa Qassim’ (prominent Shia cleric deemed by many to be responsible for a rise in anti-police violence). The objects of her anger responded by dancing and showing the victory sign.  Although some people found her actions to be deeply unpleasant,  she also received a lot of support –  as this excerpt from her Twitter feed demonstrates.

Such praise is perhaps not surprising when there are many people who believe that those who burn tyres and block roads are committing acts of terror. Indeed, the governments discourse of the uprising, which suggests protesters are either terrorists, rioters, foreign stooges, or religious nuts, has helped legitimize people’s recourse to vigililantiism – or at least harden hearts against state violence. It is not surprising that little is done about police brutality, as there are people out there who believe that victims of police violence fully deserve it. Furthermore, the disruption to many people’s daily lives caused by road blocks and tyre burning are helping to ground the government’s hyperbolic rhetoric in reality – even if the connection is tenuous.

Unfortunately, the government’s framing of the protests as acts of domestic terror or hooliganism limit the empathy felt by those who are seduced by such propaganda, for the rhetoric of terror provokes instinctive desires for protection and defence. This creates support for zero tolerance policing, and even zero tolerance citizenship, where citizens who support the status quo are protected by the state when they themselves police dissent by engaging in acts of vigilantiism. I do, for example, wonder whether a protester would so brazenly chant Down down with Hamad without at least protecting his/her identity. Remember that four Bahrainis were sentenced to prison for insulting King Hamad on Twitter. Also, two boys were imprisoned recently for mocking a Sunni cleric and filming it. Is shouting Down Down Isa Qassim and filming it also worthy of a prison sentence?  I doubt it. I mean no one should be imprisoned for insulting a cleric, but that’s not the point. The point is, will the law deal with the two cases equally?

Fallen Fruit

Today a video also emerged that shows two riot officers stealing fruit off a tree in the village of Duraz. Personally I find such footage quite interesting, as videos of the riot police usually show them engaged in their militaristic and repressive style of policing. You rarely see them doing something as human as eating. Such acts tend to undermine the cold, heartless facade created by the blue uniform, helmet and body armour. Anyway, what is interesting about them stealing the ‘Kanaar’ off a tree is that recently a migrant worker was fined 1BD and spent time in custody for doing the very same thing. Well, almost the same thing, the fruit he took had actually fallen from the tree. The court stated that under Islamic Law it was fine for someone to eat fallen fruit, so long as that person sought the permission from the owner. Although the court asked the farm owner if he would consider dropping the charges, he refused. The tragedy of the story was then compounded by Anwar Abdulrahman, editor-in-chief of the pro-gov paper Akhbar al-Khaleej,  who suggested in an oped that the farm owner’s vindictiveness stemmed from a ‘ Molotov culture’ that bread hatred and inhumanity. Obviously blaming protesters for the universal suffering of all expats has become one of the regime’s favourite propaganda devices.

Whether or not anything will happen to those two riot policeman is uncertain, though if anyone in Duraz is missing two pieces of fruit, I suggest they get in touch with the MOI. You never know, the MOI might announce a ‘ probe’ or ‘ investigation’ into the case on their Twitter account.

Foreign Plots

Crisis in Bahrain tends to prompt a predictable response from the regime – the announcement of a foreign plot. Today was no exception, and only two days after the second anniversary of the 14th February uprising, the Ministry of the Interior announced that they had arrested 8 men who were part of a terror cell with links to Iran, Lebanon and Iraq. This comes almost a month after a Kuwaiti news portal claimed Qatari authorities had intercepted an Iranian boat smuggling weapons to Bahrain. (Qatar later denied the story.) Similarly, on 21st March 2011, about a month after widespread popular protest erupted in Bahrain, King Hamad announced that a foreign plot had been foiled with the aid of Saudi troops. A week later a Kuwaiti news site said that Qatari authorities had intercepted two Iranian ships carrying weapons to Bahrain.( Again, Qatar denied the story. ) On 12th November 2011, a few weeks before the release of the BICI report, the government reported that they had discovered another terror cell with links to Iran. The same happened the day before the National Assembly was dissolved in August 1975. About 30 people were arrested from the National Liberation Front and the People’s Front. Soon after, the weekly paper ‘ al-Mawaqif’  published an article claiming that a ship loaded with arms was intercepted as it headed towards Bahrain. Many of those arrested also had ‘ pamphlets ready for distribution’. The only difference about today’s ‘ plotters’  is that they are Shia rather than ‘left-wing’.

It is of course hard to know when the government are telling the truth, though given the lack of credible evidence about such plots it seems that a lot of it is just bullshit that serves to reinforce the government’s rhetoric about a foreign bogeyman intent on interfering in Bahrain’s sovereignty. Without constant scaremongering and reminders of this threat, it is hard to make Bahrainis turn against one another and call each other that overused and disgraceful term – ‘traitors’.

Cunning Linguists: The MOI’s Rhetorical Trickery

Readers of the Ministry of the Interior’s press releases have come to expect a certain detached nonchalance. What they lack in compassion they certainly make up for in vindictive zeal. Indeed, their press releases are much more sophisticated than some of the Google translated dross that emanates from the Bahrain News Agency, as anyone who remembers the phrase ‘hostile megaphones’ will know. (If you don’t believe me, just Google ‘hostile megaphones’. It’s a BNA exclusive…) Today’s MOI press release was no exception, and as usual, they reported the death of 16 – year- old Hussain al Jaziri with their customary dispassionate flair.

Having seen dozens of similar MOI statements over the years, it is interesting to note the rhetorical devices in their statements and/or tweets. Indeed, they have a specific formula in which they do a number of the following things:

1) Vilify the victims or the people the victim was associated with. I.e. Say they were engaged in nefarious activities or doing something illegal/using weapons

2) Denounce any responsibility by indicating that the police acted in self defence

3) Use  phrases that imply lack of agency when it comes to killing. I.e. instead of saying the victim was killed, say he died. Similarly, suggest disconnect between incident and death of victim

4) Legitimize police response by mentioning how they adhered to protocol or were doing their duty

Take a look at this excerpt from today’s MOI statement concerning the death of Hussain Al Jaziri. I have included numbers used above to mark the rhetorical devices used by the MOI in their attempts to abrogate their responsibility

The most violent (1) group amassed at around 8am in the village of Daih where 300 rioters assembled to attack police (1) deployed in the area, with rocks, steel rods and Molotov cocktails (1). Warning shots (4) were fired but failed to disperse the advancing crowd which continued their attack (1). Officers discharged birdshot to defend themselves (2) and at least one rioter was injured (3) in the process. A short time later, a young man was pronounced dead at (3) Salmaniya Medical Complex.

In a similar incident in October 2012, when the police shot and killed 16-year-old Hossam al-Haddad, the MOI issued the following statement (forgive my hasty translation – original is here)

The director general of the Muharraq Police dept said that a police patrol was carrying out its duty securing (4) a crowded Al Khalifa Avenue in the middle of Muharraq, when it was subjected to a terrorist attack (1) carried out by a large number of fire bombs (molotovs) (1). This was at 9.30 pm yesterday. The attack endangered the lives of the patrol, civilians, residents and those present, which led to the injury of the patrol, fear among citizens/residents, panic, and damage to public and private property (2). The police dealt with matters in accordance with established legal procedures (4) appropriate to such cases and defended both themselves and citizens (2 and 4). This resulted in the injury (3) of one of the persons taking part in this terrorist activity (1), who was immediately taken to hospital where he died.

To confirm, this was both a terrorist act and attempted murder (1 and 2), intended to take the lives of those policemen on patrol whilst also subjecting citizens and residents to danger.
Director general says he had informed the public prosecution of the incident.

Tragically, a policeman was also killed today (February 14th 2013). Interestingly, however, it illustrates just how the MOI choose to frame the deaths of what it has, in the past, called ‘duty martrs’. The statement about the death of policeman Mohammad Asif reads as follows:

Police Officer Dies In Unprovoked Attack

The Chief of Public Security Major-General Tariq Hassan Al Hassan announced the death of policeman Mohammed Asif on Thursday at 10:50 PM.  The Chief said that Mohammed Asif was targeted by rioters in Sehla who shot a projectile that fatally injured him (1). He died on his way to hospital. The Chief stated that while Asif and several other policemen were securing roads and maintaining order in Sehla, a group of rioters attacked them with Molotov cocktails, projectiles, steel rods and stones (1). The Chief said that after Asif was injured, an investigation was immediately launched to find and arrest those responsible.  Once arrested they will be referred to the Public Prosecutor.

Contrary to the report about the death of Hussain Al Jaziri, which implied his guilt , and stated that he was participating in the day’s most violent protest (the fact the protest was termed ‘the most’ violent also indicates that police were under the most duress at this time- further legitimizing their harsh response),  the report about Mohammad Asif claims that the attack was unprovoked. So whereas protesters killed by the police are inevitably done in the name of ‘self-defence’, police killed at the hands of protesters are done so without provocation. It also states that an investigation was launched to find those who were ‘responsible’. When protesters die at the hands of the police an investigation is sometimes launched, though it rarely mentions that the purpose is to find out who is ‘responsible’. Presumably it is the protesters themselves who are responsible for their own deaths. Afterall, they are taking part in rioting right?

While it unsurprising that the MOI use these rhetorical devices to demonise protesters and absolve themselves of responsibility, it is disturbing that such statements will probably be the basis of the police’s defense argument should they actually end up in court*. This is especially disturbing when the media are prevented from baring witness to such incidents. Indeed, journalist Mazen Mahdi and a number of other reporters were arrested and detained today for covering protests (though they weren’t given an actual reason for their arrest). By removing witnesses from the scenes of such incidents the MOI are able to exploit an information vacuum, one in which their testimony will lack credible contradiction. This is especially true in a court run by a non independent judiciary dominated by members of the Ruling Family, who also run the Ministry of the Interior.

In addition to using rhetoric that demonizes protesters, the MOI often use the term ‘to become a martyr’ when referring to police casualties  They do not do this with civilians, which suggests they are attempting to appropriate the category of ‘legitimate victim’. By doing this they are also suggesting that civilian victims of police violence are not worthy of the term martyr, for the term implies that the person in question was not about to commit a sin. The lionisation of the police who die on duty, and the subsequent vilification of civilians who die at the hands of the police indicate an innate assumption that police action, no matter how despicable, is justified. This is mirrored by the fact that only four policemen  have been sentenced for killing civilians since 2011, and that was for manslaughter. Such an approach to policing tends to ‘de-emphasize the role of officers as providers of service to citizens and communities and instead treats them as surrogate soldiers following the orders from superiors.’ (Juska and Woolfson, 2012).

Furthermore, the increased militancy of many youth coupled with the militarization of policing in Bahrain is simply going to compound antagonism between citizen and state. Failure of the state’s institutions to carry out justice against police and officials will simply means that alternative avenues will be sought to achieve justice. Indeed, vigilantiism is a product of perceived righteousness in carrying out justice, and youths throwing Molotov cocktails will only ever feel more justified in their actions should the state continue to deny them the opportunity to see justice done in the courts. A just state will work to isolate those using more radical methods by demonstrating that civil society, and not the street, is the place to solve one’s grievances.

* Note too how such rhetoric finds its way into the BICI report and BICI follow up reports.

Once Again, King Hamad Meets with the Chairman of Strategic Advisory Firm G3

Yesterday King Hamad met with the Duke of Westminster, otherwise known as Gerald Cavendish Grosvenor.  The two discussed Bahrain and Britain’s historic bilateral relationship and the need to ‘enhance it’.  There was also talk of ‘bolstering cooperation’ in all fields – whatever that means.  Cryptic Bahrain News Agency jargon aside, it is interesting that the King of Bahrain is meeting with the Duke of Westminster. As well as being the richest British person, Grosvenor is chairman of G3, a strategic advisory firm hired by Bahrain’s Information Affairs Authority in 2011 to develop a ”media campaign to support Bahrain’s position in the international community”. What the contract involved was not quite clear, though Lt Gen Sir Graeme Lamb, who worked as a ‘special adviser’ to G3, wrote a number of pieces in various news outlets that focused on Britain’s important military relationship with Bahrain.

Clearly 1.5 million pounds will buy a lot more than some PR in the form of a few sketchy articles. Indeed, the fact King Hamad gets to meet with G3′s chairman  suggests that Bahrain plumped for the company’s platinum package.  King Hamad has also met with Gerald Grosvenor on a number of other occasions over the past two years. In April and May 2011, the two met at the King’s palace where they once again discussed Bahrain and Britain’s historic trade relations, and the subsequent need to ‘bolster’ them. Grosvenor also visited the Bahrain International Circuit where, judging by the photo, he refused to sit on the outlandish sofas.

The two also met in August 2012 when King Hamad visited the UK. As you may have guessed, their discussions revolved around Bahrain and Britain’s historic bilateral relations.  Whether or not the word ‘bolster’ was mentioned is unclear, though it should not be ruled out.

Incidentally, the tender for G3 was awarded in July 2011, and Grosvenor and Hamad met back in April 2011. I presume Grosvenor had a few interesting suggestions about how to boost trade between the two countries…and maybe G3 too.

Given the upcoming Grand Prix and the recent announcement of dialogue between government and Bahrain’s political parties, this is hunting season for PR companies, who will no doubt be seeking a windfall for their role in atoning for the government of Bahrain’s sins.