Tagged: Al Khalifa

Attitudes of British Officials to the Al Khalifa Family Between 1920 and 1954

King Hamad recently rocked up at the first Windsor International Endurance Festival, where he gave a speech in which he described Bahrain’s historic relationship with Britain as one of ‘cooperation and friendship’. Hamad then expressed sadness at Britain’s withdrawal from Bahrain in 1971, quoting his father as saying;

“Why? – No one asked you to go!”

King Hamad’s desire to surround himself in the UK with other people who love horses does not detract from the fact that Bahrain’s relationship with Britain has been one of mutual convenience as opposed to true friendship. Indeed, despite this so-called ‘friendship’, the attitude of many British officials to the ruling Al Khalifa family was one of disgust and frustration. A selection of quotes attributed to various British officials on the subject of the Al Khalifa is included below. Before I am accused of historic muck raking, I should point out that such comments are important in contextualizing Britain’s relationship with Bahrain, and erode the veneer of legitimacy that horse-based events and other efforts at ‘High Society Diplomacy’ attempt to confer upon this so-called friendship. Also, sometimes these things are just plain interesting.

This blog post is focused more on the historic attitude of British officials towards the ruling family in general as opposed to specific cases. The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights have documented scandals perpetrated by the Ruling Family by collating all the examples mentioned in the papers of Charles Belgrave – financial adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain between 1926 and 1957 . Similarly, I have blogged or written about various other acts of oppression or political crime performed by members of the Ruling Family, so often aided and abetted by the British. Some of these are listed at the end of this blog.

Attitudes of Some British Officials to the Bahrain Ruling Family between 1920 and 1956.

In 1923, Political Resident Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Trevor wrote about Salman bin Hamad – Bahrain’s ruler between between 1942 and 1961:

Selman bin Hamad has all the worst qualities of the Al Khalifa family. He is totally uneducated, vain, lazy, and inclined to oppress and tyrannize over anyone who is powerless to resist. Selman is absolutely unfit to succeed is father as ruler.


Colonel Knox (who seemed to entertain an equal disdain of all Bahrain’s communities) wrote in 1923:

Gentlemen of the Al Khalifa: I am afraid that looking to the past is my duty to warn you that you must not expect that because you have taken the trouble to be born you ave therefore a right to live on the rest of the community , whether by allowances from the revenues of these Islands or by preying on the poor and helpless


C.C.J. Barrett, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote in 1929:

The family – the Al Khalifa – were uneducated savages with a veneer of town manners


Charles Belgrave wrote in 1926 (21 August):

The Khalifa family is the Royal Family of Bahrain, & very much so. They are paid allowances by the Govt & do nothing apparently considering it infra dig to do any work, they are lazy conceited oppressive people for the most part, living on being royalty.

Charles Belgrave wrote in 1929:

With a few exceptions the Khalifa family are lazy, almost illiterate, and entirely without public spirit.


Bahrain’s Political Agent Captain C. G. Prior  wrote in 1929:

…apart from these all adult Al Khalifa are nonentities, incapable or vicious or all three.


Charles Belgrave wrote in his diary in 1954.

…now nobody has any opinion of the Khalifah, they are drunken, dotty & dishonest & have entirely lost the little prestige that they once had. The only one of them who people in any way respect is HH & they are rapidly losing their respect for him.

Acting Political Agent J.E.R. Little wrote in 1955:

…the ruler has donated a quarter of a million rupees to education, health and public protection. Other members of Al Khalifa apparently are impervious to the promptings of conscience.


Rape, Booze and Torture: The Princes’ Diaries

Scrutizing the Civil List in Bahrain  

How the Al Khalifas Took a Quarter of Bahrain’s Wealth

Bahrain’s History of Political Injustice 

‘Oppression of Bahrain Subjects by the Ruling Family in Bahrain in the early 1900s: The Full List

How camels led to murder and sectarian tension in Bahrain

Who Really Tried to Assassinate Shaikh Hamad?


Bahrain’s Prime Minister and his Role in the Anti-Shia Crackdown of the 1980s


‘He cries because they have nothing left to steal’ Sign: ‘Foreign Banks’ (Image is of Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa)

Bahrain has the dubious honor of having the world’s longest serving Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa. He has been in power since Bahrain gained independence in 1971. Given that lack of dynamism in any political structure is often a recipe for stagnation and regression, it makes sense to explore the Prime Minister’s historic and current role in security and policing policy. Indeed, could his continued presence in office be a contributing factor to Bahrain’s failure to reach political compromise? More specifically, to what extent has his presence, or indeed his personality,  created an increasingly sectarian policing policy that has sought to exacerbate communal strife in Bahrain for the purpose of executing a divide and rule strategy?

While it is perhaps difficult to ascertain the Prime Minister’s role behind the recent crackdown, a look at the historical records of Bahrain suggest he was perhaps more involved in policing policy than has previously been stated. This was particularly true following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when much was made of how Shia religious activists in Bahrain represented a ‘fifth column’  that wanted to export the Revolution to Bahrain. Followers of today’s uprising will be aware how the Bahrain government portray the uprising as an Iran-backed plot in order to discredit those who want political reform.

The Prime Minister himself has stated openly that the opposition in today’s uprising are acting on Iranian orders. In an  interview he gave to Der Spiegel in 2012, he stated

This movement is supported by Iran and Hezbollah…. The king has gone a long way in making many offers to them [the opposition], but in the end they told us they had to wait to see what Iran would tell them.

Shifting Authority within Internal Security

So how might the Prime Minister have been more actively involved in policing policy? Well, following Bahrain’s Independence from Britain in 1971, the head of the police and special branch were both both British. These were James Bell and Ian Henderson respectively. The FCO documents suggest that both Henderson and Bell had begun to have less influence over internal security policy as early as 1973.  State Department documents posted by wikileaks today corroborate this, stating that Bell and Henderson are moving into more of an ‘advisory’ position. In fact, they indicate that the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior (Shaikh Muhammad bin Sulman Al Khalifa) began to call the shots. Robert Tesh, British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1975 writes to the FCO

Two years ago the Chief of the Police and the Head of the Special Branch, both British, came directly under the Prime Minister and were regularly and visibly in close and constant touch with him. Now they hardly ever see him, but work to a Bahraini Minister of the Interior who is fortunately conscientious and hard-working. The Chief of Police is now ‘Director-General of Public Security’, advising and administering from the background rather than exercising direct executive control. He has lost much of his power, and rather sadly accepts this. The Head of Special Branch – which is now, at the top, wholly expatriate – is no longer allowed to detain or interrogate; his intelligence network must therefore function by other means, and the power of deterrence has dwindled. On the other hand the Government is far less exposed to the accusation of ‘imperialist repression’ than it was: and provided it does not become complacent and over-confident the new arrangements should work. The risk of complacency is not too serious as long as the present Prime Minister is in power.

Although Henderson’s changing role does not imply anything about his complicity in carrying out torture, it does have important implications for the potential rise in cases of torture. Indeed, following the crushing of leftist groups such as PFLOAG and the NLF in Bahrain, the latter of which had, according to a report by Bahrain Special Branch,  been ‘penetrated at all levels by Bahrain Security Forces’ in 1968, the opposition vacuum was  filled by the ‘Shia threat’ in the late 70s and early 80s. As such, large swathes of Bahrain’s population became a potential criminal threat, not because of their political beliefs per se, but because of the religious leanings. Naturally when you begin to potentially criminalise over half of the population, there will inevitably be an increase in arrests and, as a corollary, torture.

Despite the significance of the Iranian Revolution, it was the Iran Iraq conflict and Shia opposition to Iraq rather than the toppling of the Shah that was the catalyst for the Government’s crackdown on Bahrain’s Shia. According to British Ambassador Harold Walker (1980), support for Khomeini since the outbreak of the Iran/Iraq conflict had been negligible:

Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began there have, as you know, been virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shia for the Imam Khomeini’

Incidentally, Harold Walker seems to have changed his tune. In a 2011 article for the Conservative Middle East Council, Walker acknowledges that although the BICI report found no evidence of Iranian involvement, Iran had been the single most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion into opposition politics.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the impact of Iran has been the single most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion into opposition politics.

Torture of Jamal Ali Muhsin Al ALi and Escalation of Tensions

In fact the Shia threat was always overstated, and the government knew this. In fact, both the British and the Bahraini authorities appeared to be entirely relaxed about the potential for trouble in 1980. Although there were demonstrations, some of which turned violent, they were poorly attended and few in number. One such demonstration took place in April 1980, following Iraq’s execution of cleric Mohammed Baqr al-Sadir. After securing permission from the authorities, thousands of people marched in protest at the killing, though some people reportedly deviated from the arranged route and started burning tyres and throwing stones.  64 people were arrested, including Jamal Ali Muhsin Al Ali, who authorities accused of attacking and wounding two Bahraini Army Intelligence officers in the Souq.  Sadly, Al Ali was reportedly tortured to death*. British First Secretary Christopher Wilton mentioned Al Ali’s ‘well photographed wounds inflicted by the Bahraini Police’, and described him as the ‘first Bahraini Shia martyr’.

In an attempt to counter the rumours about Al Ali’s torture, the Ministry of the Interior kidneyissued a statement that was reported in the Gulf Daily News. They said that Al Ali had died of ‘kidney failure’. Those following the Feb14 Uprising will probably remember that the Ministry of the Interior attributed the death of Karim Fakhrawi to ‘kidney failure’. In actual fact, Karim Fakhrawi was tortured to death by the Bahrain Security Forces. (It is interesting to see the continuities of propaganda). One thousand people reportedly showed up to collect Jamal’s body from the hospital. Although the burial was peaceful, some members of the crowd then proceeded to burn tyres in the Souq.

More demonstrations occurred on the 18th and 19th June, when Hadi al Mudarrasi (exiled Iraqi cleric residing in Tehran) called on Bahrainis to mark the 40 day anniversary of Jamal’s death. According to FCO documents, only 200 people took part in these demonstrations. It was about this time the FCO and the Chief of Staff began to complain about the influx of propaganda pamphlets produced by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Most of these pamphlets (one of which you can see above) appeared to focus on political  corruption and Bahrain’s relationship with the US and Britain. On the other hand, propaganda from the Islamic Martyrs Movement was far more militant, pledging support for Khomeini and calling for death to Al Khalifa.

The Crackdown on the Shia

Despite these demonstrations, the authorities predicted a peaceful Ashura. Harold Walker writes in November 1980:

‘no necessary reason why the Ashura celebrations should lead to political disturbances any more than they have over the last decade. But they cannot exclude the possibility that tempers might flare up on account of some quite accidental occurrence such as pressure on the Shia crowd by unwise spectators’

Irrespective of whether Ashura was peaceful or not, the Prime Minister seemed keen to adopt a more draconian and sectarian internal security policy with regards to the Shia threat.

The Police have orders to intervene as little as possible – though the Prime Minister said that firm action would have to be taken once Ashura was out of the way.  (Walker to FCO, 17th November 1980)

As was predicted, Ashura passed peacefully. Interestingly, when trying to ascertain why Ashura had passed by so quietly, the British thought the authorities might have spread a rumour  that Saudi troops were in the country in order to scare the Shia.

There was a rumour, which may or may not have been inspired by the authorities, that Saudi troops were in Bahrain; this certainly had some effect as the Saudis inspire considerable fear among the Bahraini Shias.

Despite the fact Ashura had passed peacefully, the Prime Minister was true to his word and ordered the arrest of 650 people. This was in addition to the 200 people who had been arrested beforehand.  The fact Ashura had been peaceful actually ‘encouraged’ the Prime Minister to order widespread arrest of Shia. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s reason for moving against the Shia was reportedly to demonstrate to them that the ‘Bahrain Government were true Arabs’. Apparently even Ian Henderson disagreed with the decision to order this crackdown, as it would ‘probably have the opposite effect from that desired’. The information here is from a message written by Kevin Passmore of the Middle East Department. He was reporting a conversation with Christopher Wilton.  Here is the full message.

Christopher Wilton, 1 sec in Bahrain at present home leave, told me on 1 DEcember that the Bahrain authorities had decided to move against the Shia. Ashura (18/19 November) passed off peacefully. Encouraged by this, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifah, had felt confident enough to order widespread arrests of Shia. Before Ashura  some 200 had been arrested; now the total was 850, all of whom were to be detained without trial for an indefinite period. Ian Henderson, the Head of the Bahrain Security Service (who was Mr Wilton’s informant) had advised the Bahranis strongly against this course of action, saying that it was likely to lead to more Shia ‘martyrs’and would probably have the opposite effect from that desired. Sheikh Khalifa, however, had felt that the time had come to show the Shia that the Bahrain Government were ‘True Arabs’. (It is not entirely clear what he meant by this, but he probably refers to the open support given by many Bahraini Shia to IRan in the current conflict.)  (KJ Passmore to Mr Palmer, Mr Miers – 3rd December 1980)

Of course one might dismiss this as being a fairly elaborate scheme to protect the British  from accusations of excessive involvement in internal affairs. However, it does raise a number of important questions? Namely, did torture increase in Bahrain following 1975. This is, after all, the approximate date when Human Rights Organisations  began to record torture in Bahrain*.  Or does 1975 simply reflect the fact organisations such as Amnesty began to better document such cases? Afterall, brutal methods of interrogation were used in police custody as far back as the 1930s by the likes of Charles Belgrave and Captain Parke in attempting to extract information from prisoners, political or otherwise.

Having said that, is it possible that the Prime Minister’s increased control over internal security policy prompted a punitive sectarian crackdown thats sheer scale inevitably led to an increase in prisoners, and thus an increase in torture? To what extent did the influx in Shia ‘religious’  prisoners exacerbate sectarian tensions between prisoner and police officer, leading to more harsh treatment? How did the crackdown, and the torture of prisoners simply serve to radicalize religious opposition and thus attract them to more extreme causes (Afterall, policing policy in the 1950s very much relied on sewing divisions within the CNU in order to radicalise and fragment them – thus generating wider support for a crackdown)?  How credible was the alleged 1981 coup attempt that aimed to install a theocratic government?

Indeed, to what extent was crackdown on Shia simply a redux of Al Khalifa divide and rule policies that existed before increased British involvement in the 1920s? Afterall, discontent with the Al Khalifa in the 1980s was not just the preserve of the Shia –  ‘moderates’, leftists and students all had grievances. The possibility of all groups uniting to oppose the regime was a very real one, so maintaining disunity by exaggerating the Shia threat would work to isolate those groups who feared that Bahrain would turn into a theocratic state. Indeed, such divide and conquer have worked seamlessly well in the recent uprising.

But why have a crackdown when the Ruling Family and,  as Harold Walker jokes, the Al Zayyanis and Al Moyyads, could have broadened their support by reviving the National Assembly dissolved by the Prime Minister in 1975. Well, to resurrect such an assembly so soon after dissolving the last one would have been a sign of weakness, one that may have emboldened political leaders to demand more than the Ruling Family were willing to concede. Perhaps a divide and conquer strategy was simply a better way of preserving a kleptocratic autocracy that had little desire for accountability and power sharing.

Obviously I do not wish to overstate the case of the Prime Minister’s power. After all, to do so would to be sideline other members of the Ruling Family, which itself runs the risk of emphasizing that Bahrain’s draconian security policy in Bahrain is the result of a few bad apples. Indeed, much was made recently of the role of the Khawalid in undermining King Hamad, an argument that tends to absolve Hamad and the PM of their responsibility by painting them as victims of an Arabian Nights esque political saga. I also do not wish to understate the role of the British, who were keen to nip protests in the bud so as not to alarm ‘banks and board rooms’. After all, it was the British who supported the 1975 State Security Law  (although it is interesting to note that even the Butcher of Bahrain (Henderson) may have opposed the Prime Minister’s decision to move against the Shia en masse). While British concerns for internal security had been a dominating factor of British involvement in Bahrain, emphasising Henderson’s role in torture was still a useful sponge that could deflect criticism from the ruling family onto the imperialist oppressor. Indeed, Shaikh Salman in the 1950s frequently told the CNU that he would love to initiate reforms, if only the British allowed him to.

Anyway, I digress slightly. The Prime Minister is perhaps Bahrain’s most experienced statesmen, and it is hardly surprising given Bahrain’s political structure that aspects of a dominating personality may manifest themselves in security policy.  Is it not possible that part of the Prime Minister’s modus operandi is simply the reassertion of what Abdulhadi Al Khalaf describes as the Al Khalifa’s ‘legacy of conquest’, one that was diminished by increasing British involvement in Bahrain during the 1920s?

Note: This post is a work in progress, and I wrote it somewhat in haste as I was going through notes I took several months ago.  As always, comments are welcome!

 *Karim Al Hibshi was also tortured to death by Security Forces in July 1980

** Strangely, the Americans claimed that there was no ‘plausible’ evidence of torture in Bahrain in 1976. This was despite reports to the contrary issued by Amnesty International in 1974 and 1975

Who Really Tried to Assassinate Shaikh Hamad?

In 1929, Ibrahim bin Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa (a nephew of Bahrain’s former ruler Isa bin Ali) was convicted for instigating a failed assassination attempt against Sheikh Hamad in 1926. Although the men who carried out the attack were given varying prison sentences, Ibrahim was exonerated by Shaikh Hamad, who argued that because the attack had been against him, he had the power to forgive. Hamad’s mercy stemmed from both his weakness and desire to maintain family unity, itself an important factor in preventing further challenge to his rule.

However, an important aspect of the case that has so far been omitted from historical studies of Bahrain is that the initial investigations suggested that it was the ruler’s brother, Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa Al Khalifa, who had been behind the assassination attempt (I have written previously about Shaikh Abdullah’s record of rape, extortion, theft and murder here). Understandably, Hamad was troubled by the news that his brother had orchestrated an attempt to kill him, though it seems the accusations were suddenly dropped. Despite the ‘ considerable evidence’ against Abdullah, he was brought in to augment the judges on the Bahrain Court that convicted Ibrahim. When it was suggested that Abdullah be put on the court, Belgrave writes rather cryptically in his diary

‘As Abdullah is one of the people implicated he would be certain to condemn the men to shield himself, and if they accused him in Court he is quite clever enough to suppress any such idea. I think it would be a good idea to put him on the Court’.

Unless Belgrave has made a grammatical error, he appears to support Abdullah’s position as a judge in order to protect himself from accusations against his involvement in the assassination attempt on his brother. Given Abdullah’s previous, inexorable attempts to undermine Hamad’s rule, his involvement would not be unlikely. Such evidence, in addition to Abdullah’s continued attempts to work against Hamad, contradict Fuad Khuri’s assertion that Abdullah committed himself to maintaining unity within the ruling family following the abdication of Shaikh Isa in 1923. Indeed,  Khuri’s idea that Abdullah became a conciliator as opposed to a party to conflict seems too simplistic, and it was perhaps the fear of losing a generous stipend from the state that induced Abdullah to limit his intrigues against Hamad. Furthermore, despite Abdullah’s attempts to work against Hamad, he was perceived by the British as the most competent Al Khalifa, and one who was important in getting Shaikh Isa’s supporters to cooperate more fully with Hamad’s rule. Whether or not Abdullah was behind the assassination attempt is unclear, though far from unlikely. Furthermore, although Abdullah was, according to Belgrave, a ‘bad hat’, ruling family fratricide was not unusual in the Gulf at the time.

If Abdullah did attempt to kill his brother, it simply marks yet another instance of his ability to evade justice. Furthermore, the fact he was a judge on the court set a precedent for political trials in Bahrain. Let us not forget that Abdullah was one of the three judges who sat on the court that sentenced the leaders of the Committee of National Union to exile on St. Helena in 1956.